The
Ethical Primate: Humans, Freedom and Morality
by Mary Midgley
Synopsis
Midgley addresses questions
related to "human freedom and our capacity for morality. She analyzes and
rejects as 'folk psychology' the reductivism that dismisses the concepts
with which we normally live. She claims that, because reductivists ignore
the first-person view of agency, they cannot understand human freedom,
and she therefore proposes a nonreductive pattern of explanation that enables
her to bring together objective and subjective points of view. Midgley
contends that morality is a response to natural conflicts of motive, emphasizing
that we are far more aware than other animals of our own individuality
and, unlike them, not only act but recognize the actions of others as actions."
(Libr J) Index.
From The Publisher
In her new book, Mary Midgley
argues that the unrealistic isolation of mind and body in reductive scientific
ideologies still causes painful confusion. Such ideologies present crude
pictures which are not good science, since they ignore the manifest importance
of the higher human faculties. Neither inside nor outside these crude pictures
is there room for any realistic notion of the self. Why should these theories
insist on only one kind of answer? There is not just one single legitimate
explanation. There are as many answers as there are viewpoints from which
questions arise - subjective and objective, practical as well as theoretical.
Human morality arises out of human freedom: we are uniquely free beings
in that we are aware of our conflicts of motive. But those conflicts and
our capacity to resolve them are part of our natural inheritance. Although
our selves are in many ways divided, we share the difficult project of
wholeness with other organisms. What matters for our freedom is the recognition
of our genuine agency, our slight but nevertheless real power to grasp
and arbitrate our inner conflicts.
Reviews
In her new book, Mary Midgley argues that
the unrealistic isolation of mind and body in reductive scientific ideologies
still causes painful confusion. Such ideologies present crude pictures
which are not good science, since they ignore the manifest importance of
the higher human faculties. Neither inside nor outside these crude pictures
is there room for any realistic notion of the self. Why should these theories
insist on only one kind of answer? There is not just one single legitimate
explanation. There are as many answers as there are viewpoints from which
questions arise - subjective and objective, practical as well as theoretical.
Human morality arises out of human freedom: we are uniquely free beings
in that we are aware of our conflicts of motive. But those conflicts and
our capacity to resolve them are part of our natural inheritance. Although
our selves are in many ways divided, we share the difficult project of
wholeness with other organisms. What matters for our freedom is the recognition
of our genuine agency, our slight but nevertheless real power to grasp
and arbitrate our inner conflicts.
From H.C. Byerly - Choice
The title is intended to jar:
yes, morality is basic to human nature, and yes, the human being is a naturally
evolved animal. Morality, {the author} argues, is grounded in awareness
of our inner conflicts, which the integrated person can freely resolve.
Midgley refuses to surrender our experience of a whole person acting freely
to reductive analysis. Although her account hardly answers all the perplexities
concerning relations of mind to body or how we can act freely, her honest
and informed probing provides a highly sensible perspective. As a brief
work not attempting to survey the literature it has no bibliography, but
it does exhibit knowledge of a fair range of relevant biological and philosophical
literature. Clearly and gracefully written, it should prove very interesting
and accessible to a wide audience.
From Library Journal
Midgley (Can't
We Make Moral Judgments, St. Martin's, 1994) aims at making evolutionary
sense of human freedom and our capacity for morality. She analyzes and
rejects as "folk psychology" the reductivism that dismisses the concepts
with which we normally live. She claims that, because reductivists ignore
the first-person view of agency, they cannot understand human freedom,
and she therefore proposes a nonreductive pattern of explanation that enables
her to bring together objective and subjective points of view. Midgley
contends that morality is a response to natural conflicts of motive, emphasizing
that we are far more aware than other animals of our own individuality
and, unlike them, not only act but recognize the actions of others as actions.
Clearly written and well argued, this commonsensical book will be profitable
reading for anyone with a serious interest in ethical ideas and their application.
Recommended for academic and public libraries. - Robert Hoffman, York Coll.,
CUNY
From Stephen Clark - New Scientist
Midgley's work is a response
to contemporary moralizing, and contemporary beliefs about the past. Often,
she is too kind to those beliefs. . . . Some contemporary reductivists,
and maybe scientists in general, seem to derive their information about
Christian theology, modern philosophy and, especially, Aristotle entirely
from word-of-mouth, and never bother to check what they've been told. Their
historical errors should be corrected as well as their metaphysical ones.
Sometimes Midgley's own remarks about the character of contemporary professional
philosophy seem to lend weight to the claims of those like biologist E.O.
Wilson, who regard philosophers as unhelpful amateurs. . . . But these
faults are venial. Her analyses of freedom, fatalism and reductivism are
clear and cogent, and her occasional impatience with the wilder claims
of arrogant reductivists and village atheists excusable.
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